Only in the past year or two have I begun listening to RT Mullins and to be quite honest part of my reason was because of the name of his podcast The Reluctant Theologian. I finally gave in and he quickly became one of my favorite philosophers and theologians. Ryan and I share many loves (Jesus the Bible, philosophy, and sarcasm and (most importantly) metal and its various subgenres) which is why I think he became one of my favorites. The more I listened the more I began to question some of the things I once held but did not scrutinize frankly that statement is a pain for me to write because as an apologist and aspiring philosopher, I scrutinize everything (sometimes to a fault). These beliefs I began to think about and scrutinize fall under the heading: classical theism. Currently, I have been examining the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). why? Because YouTube did me dirty and fed me debates and conversations with classical theists (CT).[1]
Up until recently, DDS has not entertained more than a passing thought in my mind. Being surrounded by CT made me simply assume some things about the doctrine without much dialogue. With the onslaught of CT on YouTube and listening to Mullins (a critic of CT), my philosophically inclined mind has been having a field day! I have been challenged to go deeper philosophically, theologically, and biblically. However, I do not want to discuss the biblical basis in this blog. My goal is to attempt to charitably define the classic DDS using clearer language than typically is used. From there, I want to offer a critique while giving an alternative to the traditional account. For what it is worth, I do not think DDS needs to be given up if one thinks parts are something God possesses.
Classical DDS defined
In an article on The Gospel Coalition’s website, classical theist Matthew Barrett defines DDS as such: “Simplicity means that God is not made up of parts; he is not composite or a compound being. He is simple; All that is in God, is God.”[2] This is an is of identity making God identical to each of his attributes. With this out of the way, let’s make some other things clearer when a CT says that God is not a composite being, what he means is that nothing that is in God can exist separately from him. The most popular is statement of God comes from 1 John 4:16 where we find John saying that God is love. Two things are relevant here: 1) the love God has is not able to be separated from or exist apart from God; and 2) because of (1) God is identical with love. This means that all God’s attributes are identical to himself.
Because of these two relevant pieces it is safe to say that DDS could use a revamped definition for the sake of clarity in favor of CT and DDS. Revamped specifically because the definition given by Barrett and others utilizes technical language. This is not a bad thing at all, but it becomes very confusing for the layperson if and when they come across DDS or CT. If I were to redefine DDS for the CT it would be (to use Barrett’s as an outline): simplicity means that God is not made-up of parts that can’t exist apart from him; He is not composed of separate or separable parts; all that is in God is inseparable from God. If this maintains DDS, philosophically, then this definition should be preferred to Barrett’s and others’ similar definitions.
Issues I See with Classical DDS
Given Barrett’s definition of DDS above, there are a few issues that arise. These are all philosophical issues and because of that, there will be inevitable disagreement with what I say below. I will take up my revised definition of DDS in the next section to better understand the doctrine.
First, when we understand what is being said by DDS, a modal collapse is seemingly inevitable. Mullins and Byrd define modal collapse as, “when the typical modal distinctions between necessity, possibility, and contingency are all collapsed into one category.”[3] in other words, all of God’s actions and attributes are identical to God himself. The issue here is that attributes like eternality, omniscience, and incorporeality are identical to one another.
If we think about each of these, they have very distinct and unique definitions. Even though there is overlap in how each are exemplified they are all distinct things attributed to God. We need to be careful not to conflate overlap with identity. When we do conflate the two, we end up with a modal collapse where eternality = omniscience = incorporeality. All three should then be defined in the same exact way, meaning they should share a definition. To say that God is each of these, to avoid the modal collapse, one would have to say that God is the perfect exemplification of the attribute being discussed.[4] This also keeps us in accordance with Anselm’s iconic, and true, idea of God being the greatest conceivable being. I see nothing wrong with this characterization, but if they are truly identical then exemplification is going to look the exact same for all of them.
Second, and in conjunction with the first, is concerning identity statement language. Before jumping in on this, i want to provide a full disclosure that this is quite technical and that I am still a novice in ontology because of being a novice metaphysician I want to provide as much information as possible to help you understand my thinking here regarding identity statements. These identity statements seem to find their basis and foundation in Gottfried Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals. This general law states that “for any x and for any y if they are identical to each other, then for any property P, P will be true of x if and only if P is true of y.”[5] Confused? That is okay. Let me help provide some clarity by setting up an example.[6]
Suppose we have two members of the Trinity, the father and the son. Let the Father be represented by x and the Son be represented by y. The Trinity is then to be represented by P, meaning they have the property of being trinitarian. If Leibniz’s Law of Identity mentioned above is true, then Px = Py. This implies that x is identical to y necessarily. This would contradict the typical, orthodox trinitarian formula which states that each member of the Trinity is identical to God but is not identical to the other members, leading to a modal collapse.
Let’s apply it to God as a whole trinitarian being and his attributes. Suppose we have two attributes: incorporeal X and omniscient Y. These two attributes then have the property P of being attributed to God. According to the Leibnizian Law of Identity, Px will be identical to Py. They will be indiscernible! In other words, there is nothing different between God’s incorporeality versus God’s omniscience. Unfortunately, there is something different between the two even though they are attributed to God.
Now that we have clarified what it looks like logically, we can turn now to how these things end up playing out and how we talk about them. Many CT will make the claim that the differences in the attributes are merely formal and not real distinctions. It is best to take them in reverse order because of what is meant by these. Real distinctions, William Vallicella says, are “either mutually seperable or unilaterally seperable.”[7] In other words, they can exist apart from each other and thus the whole to which they belong. It is obvious, to me that this is the case for God and his attributes, but that does not mean these attributes are not parts. Regarding formal distinctions, Vallicella quotes Richard Cross in that they “obtain between (inseparable) parts…” What I think is really the clinching factor here is the language between seperable and inseparable. Seperable parts are ontologically distinct from God and because of that cannot be identical with God. This would make God not simple and more than one (ie. polytheistic). Inseparable parts, as we will see below, are necessarily linked and part of the whole to which they belong. They cannot exist apart from each other or the whole to which they belong.
These types of distinctions are not taught or widely acknowledged except by philosophers of religion and the occasional philosophically adept theologian.[8] It is my sense that CT and its adherents to a strong DDS should make these distinctions clear and known. When this is done, we help avoid confusion because confusion can ensue even by the most black and white thinker when clarity is left wanting. If that means going down a bit of a philosophical excursus, then that is what needs to be done. This means that the congregation or class will end up being smarter and more equipped than before they walked into the conversation, and that is never a bad thing. All that to say that the way we talk about identity matters so that we do not confuse anyone.
My third issue with DDS is just an extension of the second. We just briefly brought it up, but it is its own separate yet closely related issue. This issue surrounds the actual things that are purportedly identical. To say, as CT does, that all these attributes and actions are identical to God is to logically arrive at a modal collapse. If we are to keep these distinctions as distinctions then we do not have to grant ontological independence. To do so (grant ontological independence), God would cease to be God because there is something that is more fundamental. I do not think such granting is warranted to have an ontologically simple, yet complex being.
When we do keep these attributes distinct yet inseparable, we maintain simplicity and complexity. Just like the Trinity, there is complexity and distinctions within the unity that is the godhead. No one bats an eye to this, yet when DDS is challenged, CTS are ready to fight to the death. In keeping them distinct, not only do we allow each attribute to remain a distinct thing of God, we also can see how each are necessarily related to each of the other attributes. Without the attributes being necessarily (ie inseparable), we run the risk of making God to be a being with real, ontological distinctions. Thus, we have the attributes and their relations to each other as necessary to who God is. Adding or subtracting even a minute detail will render God a lesser being to a more fundamental reality. Making them all truly identical to each other does not allow for such relations to be seen because they in fact do not exist. It would be deceiving then, to comment on an attribute as a distinction if there was no distinction due to identity.
My Conclusion: Moderate DDS is Preferred
My proposal then for a more moderate account of DDS is not that we leave the doctrine behind but that we clarify what is meant by simplicity. In doing so what we allow for is parts within God that are inseparable yet distinct and describable.
Like I said in the beginning, I do not wish to give up TDs. I do think it needs nuance for clarity’s sake. So much of theology, albeit philosophy as well, is nuanced so why does DDS not get a treatment as well?[9] We are quick to nuance our soteriology (the doctrine of salvation) or our eschatology (the doctrine of end times), but something as widely held as DDS receives no nuance outside the academy. My guess is this is because it takes more philosophical training on the local leaderships’ part. This training is hard work but necessary. We do not have a “simple” faith in that our beliefs and actions collapse into one thing, they are parts of a genuine whole, inseparable from each other.[10] Just like our faith, a more moderate account of DDS would be to clarify the parts of God as not ontologically different yet still parts nonetheless to maintain the ability to see the relations, talk about the relations and relata (ie. attributes), and avoid a modal collapse.
[1] The abbreviation CT will be used of all conjugations of classical theism.
[2] Barrett, Matthew. “Divine Simplicity.” The Gospel Coalition. Accessed June 10, 2024. https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/essay/divine-simplicity/. This is not the only time I have heard or read a similar definition but The Gospel Coalition is a widely used and accessible form of deepening lay theological and philosophical theological thought.
[3] Mullins, Ryan, and Shannon Byrd. “Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14, no. 1 (2022): 21–52. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3414.
[4] This would make it an is of predication
[5] Moreland, J. P., and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd edition. IVP Academic, 2017. 178.
[6] I won’t use symbolic logic as that will only contribute to more confusion.
[7] Maverick Philosopher. “Divine Simplicity, the Formal Distinction, and the Real Distinction.” Accessed June 10, 2024. https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2014/06/notes-on-scotus-on-divine-simplicity.html.
[8] These types of theologians are those concerned with working out doctrines like DDS.
[9] It does in the journals but why leave it there?
[10] Much like James 2:17 says about faith and works. They are inseparable aspects, or properties, of being a Christian.
Brewed Up Apologetics 